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Krzysztof Strachota
On 16 April the citizens of Turkey voted in a national referendum to amend the constitution. 
This will lead to a radical strengthening of the president’s power. 51.4% of the voters backed 
the amendments. They will come into force after the next presidential and parliamentary 
election (scheduled for 2019). The amendments are an important step in the thorough recon-
struction of the Republic of Turkey which began in 2002. They will strengthen the position of 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in legal terms, and – with all the controversies that entails – will adjust 
the legal status to the situation on the ground. The outcome of the referendum helps to tem-
porarily stabilise the internal situation in Turkey and allows the country to be more active on 
the international arena; this includes making another attempt to thoroughly revise its rela-
tions with the EU. However, the amendment of the constitution is of a technical nature and is 
a means rather than an end in the process of building a New Turkey. Thus the calming of the 
situation in Turkey is temporary. 
The constitutional amendments
The referendum concerned 18 constitutional 
amendments proposed by the governing Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP) backed by 
a section of MPs from the opposition National-
ist Movement Party (MHP). The changes provide 
above all for a radical strengthening of the pres-
ident’s position. At present, from a formal point 
of view, this is primarily a ceremonial office and 
real power rests with the prime minister who 
must defer to parliament; the president cannot 
be a member of any political party. 
Pursuant to the amendments adopted, the 
president will gain full executive power and the 
office of prime minister will be liquidated. The 
president will have the power to nominate vice 
presidents and ministers by himself. The parlia-
ment’s autonomy and role will be curtailed. The 
obligation for the president to remain outside 
any political party will also be removed, which 
will strengthen the president’s political base. 
The presidential and parliamentary elections will 
be held on the same day, which will practically 
rule out the possibility of the president ruling 
the country in co-operation with a parliament 
dominated by the opposition. The president will 
be able to pass the budget without the need to 
obtain consent from parliament and will be able 
to pass decrees that will have the same effect as 
laws (unless a given issue is not regulated under 
a relevant law). The amendments also limit the 
scope of interpellations from MPs. 
The reduction in the number of members of the 
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors from 
22 to 13 is an essential change. Four of these 
members will be nominated directly by the pres-
ident, two by the Ministry of Justice reporting 
to the president, and the others by parliament 
(dominated by the presidential party by assump-
tion). The competences of the military courts, 
which until recently were strong, will be limit-
ed to military issues and wartime. In practice, 
the president will gain control of the judiciary.
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The constitutional amendments in Turkey will 
take effect following the next presidential and 
parliamentary elections which are scheduled 
for 2019. 
AKP rule – the regulated revolution
The constitutional amendments are a reflection 
of the fundamental and volatile changes which 
have been taking place in Turkey since 2002, i.e. 
since AKP took power. Throughout this period, 
Turkey has been undergoing a process of the 
thorough disassembly of the old post-Kemalist 
system. The change concerns the institutional 
(the real elimination of the army as the central 
and superior state institution), social (margin-
alisation of the post-Kemalist establishment, 
above all public servants) and cultural aspects 
(for example, questioning the radically secular 
and nationalist character of the state). 
AKP has canalised and reinforced the emancipa-
tion processes which had been ripening among 
the public (for example, the effect of decades 
of modernisation of the Anatolia province) and 
has capitalised on the accumulating identity 
crisis resulting from the burnout of the statist 
model of secular modernisation. AKP made 
a successful and flexible synthesis of republi-
can and nationalist slogans, of pro-democratic, 
pro-European and pro-market aspirations, and 
of conservative and Islamic values followed by 
the rehabilitation of Turkey’s Ottoman and im-
perial past. By successfully channelling social 
trends and creating conditions for the country’s 
uninterrupted economic development, the gov-
ernment contributed to a gradual formation 
of the new administration, financial and opin-
ion-forming elites, and in effect, to the crystal-
lisation of a new socio-political order in Turkey. 
The undisguised goals of the changes in Turkey 
include the creation of a new quality (New Tur-
key) and the return of its historical position of a 
political, economic and also civilisational centre 
on a de facto global scale. AKP’s agenda and 
policy have enabled the party to govern the 
country by itself since 2002 and have ensured it 
consistently strong public support over the past 
decade ranging between 40% and 50%. Given 
the fact that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has unin-
terruptedly been the party’s leader, and also 
considering his charisma and the fact that there 
is no alternative to him, he is the personifica-
tion of the party and the true leader of Turkey. 
The co-authors of AKP’s policy have been suc-
cessfully marginalised at different stages (for 
example, the former president Abdullah Gül, 
and the ex-prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu).
AKP’s rule has offered Turkey unprecedented 
civilisational and economic progress but has 
also generated enormous tension and conflicts. 
At various stages, AKP and Erdoğan personally 
have faced resistance from the old elites and 
also various social and political groups. This 
concerned above all the army and also nation-
alist parties and circles. Over time, the resist-
ance also extended to the section of the public 
holding liberal views (for example, the mass 
protests concerning the Gezi park in 2013), 
left-wing groupings (from moderate pro-Kurd-
ish groups to the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party) and radical Muslim circles (including 
terrorism linked to Islamic State). Finally, con-
flicts inside the government camp (for example, 
with the Gülen Movement) also became visible. 
The climax was reached when a section of the 
army and probably Gülen’s supporters staged 
the unsuccessful coup on 15 July 2016. The re-
sulting huge staff reshuffle inside the state ap-
paratus (army, offices, judiciary and education 
system) and outside it (for example, in the me-
dia and business) on the one hand allowed the 
most serious opponents of the government to 
be marginalised and, on the other, helped con-
solidate the political and social support base. 
AKP’s rule has offered Turkey unprece-
dented civilisational and economic prog-
ress but has also generated enormous 
tension and conflicts.
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The government has thus become stronger and 
saw an opportunity to accelerate the process 
of building a New Turkey. The amending of the 
constitution and the referendum were intend-
ed to organise the moment of the turning point 
in the Turkish policy. 
Amending the constitution  
– a response to temporary needs
The primary task has been to enshrine the po-
sition of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in law and to 
secure him as the personification of Turkey’s 
transformation. Regardless of the real power he 
has in Turkey and AKP itself and his skill of cap-
italising on subsequent crises to strengthen his 
position and, finally, his image among voters 
as the saviour and guarantor of the country’s 
stability and development, his formal position 
had been weak. The president’s competences 
are still ceremonial, and he cannot be a mem-
ber (not to mention the formal leader) of any 
political party, in this case the governing party. 
The proposed constitutional amendments give 
Erdoğan the necessary minimum: since power 
will be concentrated in the president’s hands, 
the influence he genuinely has in the state at 
present will be codified. In turn, the permission 
to be a political party member will return direct 
control of AKP into his hands. As parliamentary 
and presidential elections are being held simul-
taneously, the dependence of the parliamentary 
majority on the leader (the natural engine of the 
election campaign) will increase. Given Erdoğan’s 
present personal popularity, the weakness of the 
opposition parties and their leaders, and the de-
pleted competences of parliament in general, 
this appears to guarantee his future ‘democratic’ 
victories. The keystone of the changes is the fact 
that the judiciary system will be subordinated to 
the president. This will allow the reconstruction 
of the currently unreliable and depleted (follow-
ing purges) judiciary system in compliance with 
the president’s expectations. 
The amendments of the constitution thus lead 
to a radical centralisation of power in the pres-
ident’s hands, at the same time cancelling the 
principle of independence and balance of the 
executive, legislative and judiciary powers. 
Even though the draft constitutional amend-
ments were backed by the parliamentary major-
ity necessary to hold the referendum (AKP and 
a group of MPs from MHP), serious limitations 
which the government would have to face were 
also revealed. First of all, AKP had to withdraw 
from its plans to adopt a completely new con-
stitution that would revise the ideological foun-
dations of the state (Kemalism, nationalism and 
secularism). Only this compromise resulted in 
support from a section of MHP deputies, which 
made it possible for the referendum to be held. 
The referendum also became a catalyst of re-
sistance from the hard-line opposition (CHP, 
and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, 
HDP) and also provoked tension inside AKP (the 
fear of strengthening Erdoğan’s personal posi-
tion). This means that although the amended 
constitution is a necessary and purely technical 
stage of the changes, it still does not satisfy the 
aspirations of AKP and Erdoğan himself.
The difficult referendum campaign
Despite the dominance of AKP and Erdoğan 
on the Turkish political scene and martial law 
which helps the government (announced after 
the coup on 15 July), the government camp had 
to employ all measures available to ensure the 
victory. The highly intensive election campaign 
was also characteristic – the president and Prime 
Minister Binali Yıldırım were personally engaged 
attending events all over Turkey and both private 
and public media outlets were used. 
The campaign focused on making reference to 
Turkey’s unquestioned civilisational achieve-
ments under AKP’s rule. At the same time, at-
The amended constitution is a necessary 
and purely technical stage of the chang-
es but has not satisfied the aspirations of 
AKP and Erdoğan himself.
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tention was attracted to the existential threat 
posed by the forces opposing the changes 
(identifying them with those responsible for the 
coup, terrorists, etc.), and hence the need to 
consolidate the public around a strong leader, 
namely Erdoğan. Nationalist and civic slogans 
alike were also intensely used in the campaign 
advocating the changes. The civic slogans con-
cerned above all ‘sovereignty of the people’ 
over the institutions and the existing legal order. 
Attempts were also made to balance the Turk-
ish nationalism with declared openness to eth-
nic and religious minorities (for example, Kurds 
and Alevis who are loyal to the state). Another 
essential element of the campaign was drawing 
on the Great Turkey idea, i.e. a country responsi-
ble for the areas which have historical links with 
Turkey but remain outside its borders, as well as 
affirming and mobilising the Turkish diaspora 
(above all in Western Europe). The problems with 
relations with EU member states, including dif-
ficulties with conducting the election campaign 
in Europe, were used to strengthen the negative 
perception of Europe (as being anti-Turkish and 
Islamophobic). They were intended to intensify 
the sense of threat and point to the lack of an 
alternative to a strong Turkish state as the pro-
tector of the rights of Turks worldwide. 
The campaign run by the opposition parties was 
much weaker than that of the government. The 
main reason for this weakness was the conse-
quences of the repressions waged by the gov-
ernment – for example, the leaders of the op-
position party HDP have been under arrest since 
last November on charges of supporting terror-
ism; many opponents of the government have 
been detained as part of the investigation wave 
following the coup, while others may feel intim-
idated. The opposition clearly had less access to 
the media and less funds at its disposal. Finally, 
when compared to AKP, it displayed marginal 
public activity (CHP leaders chose not to have 
large-scale contacts with voters and entrusted 
local structures with the task of holding rallies). 
In ideological terms, the government has been 
accused of disassembling Turkey’s institutional 
and legal order, Erdoğan’s authoritarian ambi-
tions, the illusory stability embodied by AKP, and, 
finally, the founding myth of the present stage 
of transformation in Turkey was undermined, i.e. 
the significance of the coup in 2016 (allegations 
that the government was engaged in the coup, 
fundamental reservations regarding the findings 
made so far in the investigations following the 
coup). As regards the referendum, the opposi-
tion mainly pinned their hopes on the assump-
tion that the public are tired with the tempo of 
the changes, the lack of understanding of the 
sense of the changes and the hidden erosion of 
AKP’s base (manifestations of this included, the 
fact that the recent co-leaders of AKP distance 
themselves from the ‘yes’ campaign, some os-
tentatiously, such as Abdullah Gül). 
The fact that the constitutional amendments 
were adopted with a support level of 51.41% 
(with turnout at 85.3%) basically confirmed the 
assumptions of both sides. The active ‘yes’ cam-
paign made it possible to increase the support 
level for the changes by around 10% (the level of 
support in the first forecasts was around 40%). 
The ‘no’ campaign revealed a strong negative 
electorate opposing the changes. The OSCE’s 
post-election report emphasised the systemic 
inequality of opportunities for the opposition 
to conduct an election campaign. 
The controversies over the validity of some bal-
lots overshadowed the campaign. According to 
CHP, the number of unstamped ballots could be 
as high as 1.5 million – however, this allegation 
was rejected by the Supreme Election Board 
(YSK). One of the YSK’s functions is the instance 
supreme appeals, and the election result itself 
was considered valid. Regardless of the high 
tension accompanying the referendum, no 
massive public protests were seen after its re-
sult was announced (small groups of protesters 
picketed in major cities). 
Despite the strong tension accompanying 
the referendum, no massive public protests 
were seen after its results were announced.
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Conclusion and forecasts
The amendment of the Turkish constitution as 
a result of the referendum is a quantum leap 
in the process of building the New Turkey. 
The constitutional amendments seem to pre-
ordain the irreversibility of the disassembly of 
the old political system. The referendum spells 
a definite withdrawal of the democratic state 
model based on a balanced tripartite division 
of power and replacing it with a model based 
on the dominance of the presidential office 
and a mandate obtained directly from voters. 
This process is reinforced by the government’s 
informal control of the media market, political 
control of the state apparatus, informal domi-
nance in the economic sphere and the tempo-
rary conditions of martial law. The possibilities 
of politically counteracting these trends are at 
present minimal. Nevertheless, the process of 
determining the details and bringing the New 
Turkey project closer to reality is far from over 
– the recent constitutional amendments are 
mostly technical, and they will only be imple-
mented after the next election. 
The way the referendum was held and its out-
come have strengthened the position of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan on the Turkish political scene. 
He has gained legal confirmation of his posi-
tion as the leader of the republic. Furthermore, 
the fact that the vote was held nationwide, 
preceded by an intense election campaign, has 
consolidated his social support base and added 
a social mandate to his ambitions. At the same 
time, the referendum has confirmed and poten-
tially also cemented the opposition’s inability to 
block his policy, not to mention their inability 
create a constructive alternative to Erdoğan. 
The referendum offers Turkey a chance for 
a temporary stabilisation: the government has 
renewed its public mandate to rule the coun-
try, the opposition does not currently pose any 
real threat, and the emotions accompanying 
the campaign are fading (proof of this includes 
the lack of major protests). The government can 
now resume the policy of structural reforms in 
the economy that have been slowed down due 
to the political volatility. Turkey’s internal stabil-
ity and hopes for further reforms are desirable 
and have been noticed by the financial markets 
– the Turkish currency has strengthened and 
the bond interest rate has fallen. 
However, regardless of the temporary prereq-
uisites for the stabilisation of the situation in 
Turkey, the country is in the process of a deep 
and risky internal transformation. The threats 
are linked, for example, to the transitional pe-
riod preceding the constitutional amendments 
entering into force following the next election. 
Erdoğan has been forced to reorganise his po-
litical base (steps have been made to prepare 
the reinstatement of his membership of AKP 
before the election), remove people who are 
not loyal enough from the party and to pre-
pare the party for the election. The opposition 
is about to face equally serious challenges. CHP 
will certainly feel forced to revise its policy and 
expand its voter base (it can count on a hard-
line electorate of 20–30%). In turn, the Nation-
alist Movement Party needs to decide wheth-
er it should continue its symbiosis with AKP 
or become a radical opposition; there is great 
tension inside the party regarding this choice. 
The changes on the political scene mean it is 
impossible to rule out snap parliamentary and 
presidential elections being held, which would 
lead to the political situation in the country be-
coming strained again. 
Another challenge, even more serious, is the 
amount of systemic tension inherent in Turk-
ish politics and its unpredictability (serious up-
heavals and turbulence affect Turkey once every 
six months on average). These problems (only 
seemingly limited to the south-eastern part of 
The way the referendum was held and its 
outcome have strengthened the position 
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the Turkish 
political scene.
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the country) include the conflict inside the PKK 
and the lack of a positive agenda for a break-
through in relations between the state and the 
Kurdish minority. At the same time, the growing 
threat of Islamic radicalism and terrorism is an 
open question. The problem of both nationalism 
(Kurdish and Turkish) and Islam are of key signif-
icance in the process of developing a new state 
ideology – and both are equally socially contro-
versial. Another challenge is the strong poten-
tial of hidden public dissatisfaction which was 
manifested with great strength already in 2013 
(millions of people took to the streets across the 
country as a result of a local dispute over the de-
velopment of the Gezi Park in Istanbul). The last 
of the chronic challenges Turkey and its govern-
ment are facing is the constant risk of mutiny 
inside the elite – it does need to be emphasised 
that revealing the scale of the conflict between 
Erdoğan and the Gülen Movement (since 2013) 
and the decision to try to stage a coup inside the 
seemingly pacified army (2016) came as a sur-
prise. Erdoğan has so far successfully coped with 
such challenges, and even capitalised on them 
to strengthen his position. However, a different 
scenario cannot be ruled out (and this would 
pose the risk of a deep and long crisis). 
Erdoğan’s victory in the referendum also makes 
it possible to expect activation in international 
politics. This is temporarily linked to the end of 
the intense pre-election campaign and focusing 
on domestic issues, and the sense of the pres-
ident’s position being strengthened after the 
victory. Erdoğan plans to visit the USA, Russia, 
China, India and Brussels in May 2017 alone. This 
proves that the president is determined to re-
solve the mounting problems linked to the situa-
tion in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq and the Kurds) 
and the controversies in bilateral relations (the 
USA and Russia) as well as the intensification of 
supra-regional co-operation, above all economic 
(with China and India). In the broader context, 
this is a return to the ambitions of increasing 
Turkey status as an independent player and 
marking its role in global politics. 
However, relations with the European Union play 
a special role in Turkish politics at the moment; 
hence the significance of the planned visit to 
Brussels. The strength of the multi-level co-de-
pendencies between Turkey and Europe is pro-
portionate to the escalating misunderstandings 
and mutual recriminations. Those from the EU 
include sharp criticism of the authoritarian ten-
dencies in Turkey or of Turkey’s playing on the 
issue of the Turkish minority in Europe. In turn, 
those from Turkey include allegations of using 
double standards (partly caused by anti-Turkish-
ness and Islamophobia), the EU’s failure to com-
ply with its obligations to Turkey regarding finan-
cial issues and visa liberalisation, and tolerating 
the PKK in the EU. Both in Turkey and in the EU 
(as manifested, for example, by the tension sur-
rounding the referendum campaign in Europe), 
the mutual controversies are escalated and suc-
cessfully used on the domestic arena. Given this 
context, it is likely that Erdoğan – strengthened 
in his opinion by the outcome of the referendum 
and the effects of the foreign visits this May – 
will make another attempt at a thorough revi-
sion of political relations with the EU aimed at 
replacing the ineffective European integration 
with a format based on the two parties treating 
one another more as equal partners and basing 
bilateral relations more on mutual deals. 
